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Chapter 2
Capitalism’s Collapse
The collapse of capitalism does not presage the socialist utopia upon which twentieth century revolutionaries pinned their hopes. Nor does 
it mean the end of capital as the basis for the economy. The capitalism 
that is collapsing is the kind of political economy regnant since the early 
nineteenth century, centered first in northern Europe, then in the settler 
states of North America and Australia, and finally in Japan and other parts 
of Asia. It is the kind of industrial capitalism described and analyzed by 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Its essential features include free wage 
labor, private property, and a regulatory state. The successor system has yet 
to form. That position is up for grabs.
Immanuel Wallerstein (2003) has argued that “[t]he world capitalist 
system is, for the first time, in true systemic crisis” (223). Inherent insta-
bilities in the system caused the crisis. With its breakdown, the longtime 
dominance of capital no longer sustains a global political economy. The 
first decades of the twenty-first century, therefore, reflect an age of tran-
sitions between systems. With respect to its transitional character, the 
current period resembles the late fifteenth century. Wallerstein distin-
guished cyclical rhythms of the system—the boom and bust cycle—that, 
in fact, maintain its equilibria based on the trends growing out of those 
cycles. Accumulation of capital defines capitalism; the mechanism for 
accumulation is profit; costs offset profit. Wallerstein notes three types of 
cost: labor, inputs and infrastructure, and taxation. “[O]ver five hundred 
years and across the capitalist world-economy as a whole, the three costs 
have all been steadily rising as a percentage of total value produced” (226). 
The repeated crises caused by overaccumulation—resulting in a falling 
rate of profit—have reached the point where refashioning the system 
can no longer restore profitability. The falling rate of profit has reached 
a global and systemic asymptote. Therefore, the current global finan-
cial crisis comes from a basic systemic disequilibrium and not cyclical 
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 readjustments, no matter how severe they seemed. The current crisis 
goes far beyond the Great Depression of the interwar period, or the Long 
Depression, which began in 1873 and continued through the last decades 
of the nineteenth century. Increasing productive efficiency through tech-
nological innovations—the computer revolution, for example—and the 
neoliberal offensive of the late twentieth century are but “one gigantic 
attempt to slow down the increasing costs of production” (226).
Wallerstein explained the causes of the rise in the three forms of cost. 
The cost of labor rises through workers organizing—syndical action. 
Traditionally, capitalists have countered this cost in a two-step process. 
First, they resisted workers directly—often by force—and ultimately, they 
relied on the state to suppress workers’ organizing efforts. The many indus-
trial clashes famous after the Civil War in the United States and other such 
events continuing through to the Memorial Day massacre at Republic Steel 
in Chicago in 1937, record this strategy. Eventually, however, this strategy 
fails because capitalist societies are also mass-based polities. Regardless of 
how undemocratic a regime might be, workers ultimately get their raises 
in the face of forceful opposition. The second step in the process to reduce 
labor costs takes the form of flight. Capitalists move production to lower 
labor-cost regions. The northeast and midwest turn into rust belts, while 
the south and southwest thrive. When those regions become too costly, the 
capitalist flees farther to so-called developing countries on the periphery. 
This second step became the preferred model for the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century. The latest notorious example is the General 
Motors bankruptcy. The corporation declared bankruptcy in the United 
States while using government bailout money to finance moving assets 
to China (Daily Finance 2009; New York Times 2009; Wall Street Journal 
2009). Usually, such moves also help reduce the second and third catego-
ries of costs—inputs and infrastructure and taxation.
Inputs and infrastructure costs include raw materials and the costs of 
transport, waste disposal, and the like. Moving production to developing 
areas of the world often means moving them to countries with coopera-
tive regimes. The regimes usually offer forces to control labor organizing, 
relatively few and weakly enforced environmental laws, and low taxes on 
 corporations. Unfortunately for this capitalist strategy, developing areas 
turn into developed areas, and this occurs much faster than it did in the core 
areas of capitalism. What took Western Europe and North America a cen-
tury and a half takes developing areas only a few decades. Fleeing from costs, 
therefore, just puts off the inevitable. It buys time but does not solve the 
underlying problem. Furthermore, curbing these sources of costs, especially 
labor costs, exacerbates one of the underlying contradictions of industrial 
capitalism: paying low wages reduces the market for the goods and services 
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that are produced. If workers are not paid enough to buy what they make, 
the capitalist cannot sell enough to make a profit. All these costs and contra-
dictions have come to the point where capital has no place left to flee.
Marx’s Falling Rate of Profit
Marx posited a general law of capital—namely that the rate of profit will 
decline over time. Its cause is fundamental to the effect of capital in society. 
Capital organizes productive capacity. It does so by creating those objects 
needed to produce capital equipment like machines and infrastructure 
like roads. More importantly, capital organizes the productive capacity 
of people. Industrial capital, unlike all other forms of political economy, 
intervenes in the productive process. It organizes work. In Marx’s time, the 
most visible effect of this property of capital took the form of factories and 
factory discipline. Today, one of the best-known descriptions of this his-
torical process appears in Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975). 
Worker input or labor capacity is the source of surplus value, which is 
profit. Capital not only disciplines workers, it also makes their work more 
efficient. Fewer workers are needed to produce. This creates what twentieth-
century economists call structural unemployment. Nonetheless, capital 
as the organizing force of society takes account of all workers, whether 
employed by a particular group of capitalists or not. The surplus value of 
a product contains all the labor power, whether or not it is used to make 
the product. This is the key to Marx’s analysis. One capitalist may increase 
profits by laying off workers, but the system of production employs, in 
the more abstract sense of that term, all the workers in a society.
The progressive tendency of the general rate of profit to fall is, therefore, 
just an expression peculiar to the capitalist mode of production of the progres-
sive development of the social productivity of labour. This does not mean 
to say that the rate of profit may not fall temporarily for other reasons. 
But proceeding from the nature of the capitalist mode of production, it is 
thereby proved a logical necessity that in its development the general aver-
age rate of surplus-value must express itself in a falling general rate of profit. 
Since the mass of the employed living labour is continually on the decline 
as compared to the mass of materialised labour set in motion by it, i.e., to 
the productively consumed means of production, it follows that the por-
tion of living labour, unpaid and congealed in surplus-value, must also be 
continually on the decrease compared to the amount of value represented 
by the invested total capital. Since the ratio of the mass of surplus-value to 
the value of the invested total capital forms the rate of profit, this rate must 
constantly fall. 
(Marx 1894, vol.3:213)
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Marx goes on to make clear that the decline in surplus value, and therefore 
profit, relates to the total capital in a society. And so, once globalization suc-
ceeded, the entire world became one big society, at least as far as the capital-
ist system is concerned. The rate of profit in global capital now approaches 
zero, hence it occasions the collapse of the world capitalist system.
Because the rate of profit declines as a function of capital  accumulation—
the more capital, the more productive efficiency, the lower the rate of 
profit—several other consequences follow. In Chapter 15 of Volume 3 of 
Capital, Marx explained that the falling rate of profit weeds out less efficient 
and smaller capitalists, thereby concentrating capital. Overaccumulation 
and falling rates of profit lead to overproduction, speculation, crises, and 
surplus capital, along with redundant populations. In the past, these 
conditions and consequences have led to the great economic depressions. 
They last until the surplus capital gets used up. The best-known historical 
precedent was the Great Depression. It did not end until the Second World 
War deployed the surplus capital by literally destroying it. Marx’s law of 
the falling rate of profit fulfills the idea made famous in the Manifesto of 
1848 that capitalism is its own grave digger. Usually taken in a simple polit-
ical sense—that, by creating a proletariat, capitalism has formed a group 
that will overthrow the capitalist regime—the falling rate of profit thesis 
shows that accumulated capital cannot help but eventuate in destroying 
the  capitalist system. The irony is that capital provides the most effective 
answer to the age-old question of all ruling classes: how to get the masses 
to work. It does so, however, in a way that guarantees its own destruction.
Marx’s theory for the falling rate of profit entails a crucial connection 
between capital and social control. Capital organizes social production. It 
organizes time and space, as in Taylorism and Fordism, with the imposi-
tion of the assembly line. The assembly line is just an obvious example. 
Capital organizes all social time and space. For example, in the United 
States, commercial time—roughly 9 a.m. to 10 p.m.—distinguishes 
day from night. Nighttime is when most businesses close. Shopping 
districts define neighborhoods in most cities. Marx observed early on 
that industrial capitalism differs from all previous modes of production 
in that capital intervenes in the work process. In feudal production, for 
example, the ruling class just appropriated work products without them-
selves organizing workers or their work. Industrial capitalism provides the 
time, place, and manner of production. Also, as Marx said in the preced-
ing quote from Capital, industrial capitalist production organizes all the 
 “living labor,” not just those employed at a given time or place. To organize 
all labor implicates the state, as the state is the main instrument of social 
control. For example, the state operates in the interest of capital’s organiz-
ing needs through municipal zoning ordinances—heavy industrial, light 
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industrial, commercial, residential, and so on. The industrial capitalist 
mode of production inseparably enmeshes the state with a definitive char-
acter of capital—policing the social order. The state disciplines labor and 
creates a disciplinary society. The state’s role remains fundamental because 
it defines private property. By defining private property through law, the 
state becomes a separate entity, apart from civil society (Marx and Engels 
1846). Capital orders labor when workers sell their labor, and private 
property subsumes labor when employers organize workers’ “individual 
functions into one single productive body” (Marx 1867:449) to overcome 
their resistance to capital’s imperative. 
It was not the introduction of machines that subordinated labour. It was the 
ill-defined “revolution” in the organization of production during the period 
of manufacture that facilitated the introduction of machines. Society is not 
disciplinary because it is capitalist; rather capital derives its profits from that 
which makes society disciplinary [emphasis added].”
(Marsden 1999:144–145)
Systemic Change and the Age of Transition
Wallerstein (2003) used chaos theory to extend the implications of the 
collapse of the capitalist system. As with all systems, once it enters sys-
temic crisis, it bifurcates as it moves irremediably away from equilibrium. 
It enters a period of chaos. Such periods have wide fluctuations among 
all system variables, extremes in all areas of social life, and on a global 
scale. The twenty-first century opened on the greatest difference between 
rich and poor in history. Speculation rampages, resulting in, inter alia, 
the financial crisis that began in 2008. Financial controllers like central 
banks cannot control it. Wars small and large keep breaking out, not 
between major powers, but in various combinations of major powers, 
local, regional, and civil conflicts everywhere. The inability of the United 
States, the UN, NATO, or any power block to prevent wars in Yugoslavia, 
the Congo, or Afghanistan testify to such effects. Consequences of socially 
organized causative vectors, global warming for instance, drastically affect 
the physical environment. Extreme weather, epidemics, draughts, and 
floods follow (Wallerstein 2004:87). The good news is that during periods 
of chaos, people can make effective changes and help mold the successor 
system.
Catastrophe theory and chaos theory refer to mathematical models 
of dynamic systems. They build on the general systems theory of Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy (1950, 1968) that treated interaction holistically. Systems 
theories describe and explain dynamics in general. They are not bound to 
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anything particular, but focus on the dynamics themselves. René Thom 
developed what came to be called catastrophe theory. Thom was a mathe-
matician specializing in topology, a field of geometry. Thom (1973) theo-
rized that changing systems follow a limited number of forms, which he 
described in mathematical equations. There are no more than seven such 
forms. Equilibrium points are central to his theory. Stability in dynamic 
systems assumes fluctuations among points or attractors. For example, 
in capitalist political economies, capitalists and workers act as the most 
salient attractors, and their dynamics involve continual class conflict. 
Perturbations in such systems, such as economic depressions, come from 
disturbances in the political economy as a whole. Catastrophes occur when 
systemic regulators no longer contain the conflict through various insti-
tutional responses. Such crises always hold the potential for bifurcation of 
the system. Bifurcation occurs at a tipping point where the system stops 
organizing itself and enters a chaotic state. 
Chaos theory describes chaotic dynamics as nonequilibrium states of 
systems. Henri Poincaré first described it in his 1890 paper on the three-body 
problem in astronomy. Despite initial insights in the first half of the twentieth 
century, chaos theory became formalized as such only in 1960. It first became 
evident to some scientists that linear theory, the prevailing system theory 
at that time, simply could not explain observations of certain experiments. 
What had been excluded as measure imprecision and simple “noise” was con-
sidered by chaos theorists as a full component of the studied systems. Edward 
Lorenz (1963) pioneered modern chaos theory. He discovered a descriptor 
of chaotic states through his work on weather prediction in 1961. When 
running a weather simulation, he wanted to see a sequence of data again. To 
save time, he started the simulation in the middle of its course. He entered 
data from a printout of the data corresponding to conditions in the middle 
of his simulation, which he had calculated the last time. To his surprise, the 
weather that the machine began to predict was completely different from 
the weather calculated before. The computer worked with 6-digit precision, 
but the printout rounded variables off to a 3-digit number. This difference 
is tiny, and the consensus at the time would have been that it should have 
had practically no effect. Lorenz had discovered that small changes in initial 
conditions produced large changes in the long-term outcome. Lorenz’s dis-
covery gave its name to Lorenz attractors, also known as strange attractors, or 
the butterfly effect: a butterfly flapping its wings in Argentina can produce a 
typhoon in Indonesia. When systems lose equilibrium and enter chaos, they 
do not behave randomly. Typically, they exhibit large fluctuations, but such 
fluctuations follow patterns around barely detectable variables.
Fractals are another piece of chaos theory. Fractals are forms with the 
same structural pattern regardless of their size. For example, a one-meter 
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stretch of the coastline of Britain has the same structure as the coast’s 
entire length. Benoit Mandelbrot (1982) discovered the mathematical 
description of fractals originally in 1960—about the same time Lorenz 
discovered his attractors. He found recurring patterns at every scale 
in data on cotton prices. In 1967, he showed that a coastline’s length varies 
with the scale of the measuring instrument, resembles itself at all scales, 
and is infinite in length for an infinitesimally small measuring device. An 
object whose irregularity is constant over different scales, “self-similarity,” 
is a fractal. Fractal theory contributes to chaos theory in showing the rep-
lication of small variations according to regularities or structural patterns. 
Thom’s catastrophe theory, Lorenz’s attractors, and Mandelbrot’s fractals 
have application to analyzing world systems of political economy, espe-
cially when such systems tip past their equilibrium points and bifurcate. 
All these theories have become subsumed under the general term, “chaos 
theory” (Gleick 1988; Prigogine and Stengers 1984).
Writing in 1994, Wallerstein argued that the world capitalist system 
was headed for bifurcation and would enter a state of chaos. He began his 
argument by pointing to Kondratieff cycles, those long-term fluctuations 
under capitalism lasting fifty to sixty years. Each cycle separates into an 
A phase and a B phase, which are roughly equivalent to expansion and con-
traction or good times and bad times. For instance, the Long Depression 
that began in 1873 and the Great Depression of the 1930s were parts of 
Kondratieff B phases. The boom after the Second World War, 1945–1973, 
was an A phase (Hobsbawm 1994; Mandel 1995). These fluctuations 
measure capital accumulation and class conflict, in which the working 
class and bourgeoisie act as poles generating the dynamic flux. Wallerstein 
argued that, on previous times, factors affecting capital accumulation 
and class conflict produce perturbations in the world system, but the 
system continually returned to equilibrium after a period of refashioning 
itself. The Kondratieff cycles measure these perturbations. One analogy 
is the human body that maintains a homeostatic internal temperature of 
37.0 °C (98.6 °F). Various factors can create disturbances or perturbations 
so that it rises or falls. Most commonly, we think of infectious disease. 
Nonetheless, as long as a body continues to live, it returns to somewhere 
close to the equilibrium point. Similarly with the world capitalist system, 
as various destabilizing factors beset it.
Wallerstein identified eight such factors. He argued that these eight 
factors combine to push the system past its tipping point into bifurcation 
and chaos. The first is that the world will no longer be unipolar under 
U.S. hegemony. Second, investment will concentrate in older areas such as 
China and Russia leaving little for the new areas of the global south such 
as Africa and Latin America. Hence, the global North-South gap will grow. 
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Coupled with that, the third factor is disparate demographics with continu-
ing high population growth in the South and little growth in the North. 
Those in the South will exert massive pressure for migration—especially 
among the middle strata, educated persons—thereby lowering wages 
of similarly situated white-collar workers in the North. Denizens in the 
North will apply political pressure in favor of repressive limitation against 
migration—the formerly so-called dangerous classes (immigrants and 
marginalized racial and ethnic groups). Fourth, expansion of investment 
in the coming Kondratieff A phase will squeeze employment in the middle 
strata as capitalists try to increase profits along with a reduction in state 
budgets for public services such as health and education. “In any case, 
the capitalist world-economy will be faced with the immediate dilemma 
of either limiting capital accumulation or suffering the politico-economic 
revolt of the erstwhile middle strata” (Wallerstein 1994:445). The fifth factor 
comes from ecological constraints, both the depletion of natural resources 
and environmental degradation such as that caused by green house gases 
and consequent global warming. Sixth, the capitalist world system has 
run out of world. There are no more areas that capital has not thoroughly 
penetrated. Deruralization is approaching the maximum. The seventh fac-
tor pertains to the middle strata in the global South, whose numbers have 
risen significantly and who demand a living standard and consumption 
that will strain the world economy and detract from capital accumulation. 
Eighth, and finally, Wallerstein pointed to the twin rise of democratization 
and decline of liberalism. The liberal solution restricted the dangerous 
classes to the core areas of the world system. Since the 1970s, liberalism has 
withered. At the same time, pressure for democratization steadily grows. 
“[T]he dangerous classes become dangerous once more” (449). These fac-
tors taken together create conditions of endemic and increasing violence, 
ever greater speculative fluctuations in the world economy, and relatively 
unpredictable changes in formerly well-established institutions. Think of 
the recent movement to privatize public education in the United States as 
one example. The upshot is the end of the world capitalist system as the 
system bifurcates under fluctuations it cannot contain.
Elite Responses in Times of Crisis
The elites—the ruling classes—respond to systemic crises by looking out 
for themselves, not by trying to save the system. If Wallerstein is correct, 
the current crisis of the world capitalist system has few precedents. One 
was the collapse of the Roman Empire, which ended the ancient world. 
The other was the collapse of feudalism and advent of the current system 
in Europe around 1500 C.E.
CAPITALISM’S COLLAPSE  31
Two apologias are in order. First, the following discussions on the 
Roman Empire and end of feudalism neither prove nor polemicize his-
torical arguments. Instead, they illustrate how elites behave in times of 
general crisis and collapse. Second, there is a Western, Eurocentric bias. 
The collapse of Rome did not end a world system, as other empires, nota-
bly in Asia, followed their own trajectories. The end of the Middle Ages 
in Europe also was not a global phenomenon. Nonetheless, the current 
world capitalist system originated in Europe, and therefore favors the 
Eurocentric bias.
The mode of production in the ancient world depended on slavery and 
bound peasantry. Ancient states organized production. The states took the 
form of empires. Empires enforce a redistributive economy in which basic 
producers, mainly agricultural with some artisanal manufacture, support 
the state machinery. The largest state sector is a military that enforces 
redistribution in domestic populations and conquers new territories, thus 
ensuring arable land and a supply of slaves. World empires subjugate sur-
rounding tribal peoples and land. The periphery of empire is the site of 
primitive accumulation. The middle strata control long-distance luxury 
trade, while the upper strata control the military that garners tribute 
(Wallerstein 1974b:90). World empires have a political center that controls 
space. Their control depends on military force under bureaucratic regula-
tion supported by an ideological apparatus, typically based in religion. The 
means of control are extremely costly and eventually lead to the demise of 
the empire as it overextends itself. Rome became the most developed and 
complex of imperial societies, unequaled except by China.
Bryan Ward-Perkins (2005) argued that invasions from the  periphery, 
coupled with internal civil war and social unrest, undid the fabric of the 
Roman Empire. These dislocations eroded the tax base so critical for 
supporting a permanent, professional army that functioned as the cen-
terpiece of imperial control. The Roman elite sought their own security. 
One strategy had peripheral tribal peoples become part of the empire. 
After all, the barbarians invaded the empire to get a piece of the pie, not 
due to ideological differences. As Ward-Perkins pointed out, even the 
Vandals, a scourge of a civilization, found themselves treaty partners with 
the Empire. “[E]mperors found it easier to make treaties with invading 
Germanic armies—who would be content with grants of money or land—
than with rivals in civil wars—who were normally after their heads” (52). 
The imperial elite threw local provincials to the wolves to defend against 
other invading tribes and rivals in civil wars. Of course, these strategies 
further unraveled the Empire’s bonds, as these semiperipheral areas with 
their own local elites saw little reason to support the imperium. “The 
imperial government was entirely capable of selling its provincial subjects 
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downriver, in the interests of short-term political and military gain” (56). 
Class-consciousness by the imperial elite did not lead them to support the 
institution of Empire. It did, however, lead them to recognize their self-
interests as a class. They were entirely willing to jettison everything but 
that which maintained their privilege.
The Empire disintegrated, and the Western world entered a chaotic 
transition phase. Feudalism emerged as the new system. The feudal mode 
of production differed little from that of the Roman Empire. It was an agri-
cultural economy with bound labor and direct extraction of surplus value 
in that the political system ensured surplus extraction. The feudal politi-
cal system differed from that of the ancient world, as relations between 
producers and exploiters were derived from transgenerational personal 
bonds. Custom bound both lord and peasant. Unlike the Roman imperial 
system where the Empire intervened, the manor was the main economic 
and political unit: “the lord’s estate became the state” (Katz 1989:57). 
Repeatedly, throughout the middle ages, strong men—Charlemagne 
(742–814), Frederick Barbarossa (1122–1190), and others who were 
less successful—tried to reestablish a world empire modeled on Rome. 
None succeeded. Nonetheless, the feudal mode of production  persisted, 
and formed the foundation upon which the capitalist world system 
emerged.
The Roman Empire and the world empire of the ancient world dis-
integrated in the fifth century; the medieval world began its end in the 
fifteenth century. Almost exactly in the middle of the fifth century, around 
1450, developments and events marked the end of the old system and a 
transition to its successor, the world capitalist system. Some of the most 
prominent of these landmarks are the development of moveable type 
(printing), the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, the development of 
canons, the end of the Hundred Years War, and the employment of linear 
perspective in drawing. During the succeeding decades of the fifteenth 
century, technological advances and political reconfiguration facilitated 
the demise of feudalism. These included the employment of rudders on 
ships, the invention of the astrolabe—forerunner of the sextant—for 
navigation, and, probably the most important for the advent of world 
 capitalism, double-entry bookkeeping. The foregoing did not cause the 
transition of the fifteenth century; they act as historical signposts. Western 
feudalism broke down for far more existential reasons: a crisis in produc-
tivity and means of extracting surplus.
The economy of Europe remained largely agricultural. Beginning in 
the last half of the fourteenth century, agriculture reached its  optimal 
productivity. At the same time, the landowning seigniorial class competed 
among themselves to expand their demesnes to secure more income. 
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Consequently, the ruling class accrued greater expenses due to their 
internecine warfare. When the landowners squeezed the peasantry to 
extract greater surplus, they revolted. Peasant revolts became endemic 
and increasingly intense. A general decline in prosperity ensued abetted 
by wars, famine, and epidemics, resulting in population decline and a 
recession from marginal lands. The enclosure movement became a third 
factor contributing to the crisis. Landowning aristocrats engrossed for-
merly common lands. Rising management costs prodded them to turn 
away from direct management toward tenancy. All three—peasant unrest, 
seigniorial competition, and enclosure—began to transform the politi-
cally weak feudal system. Aristocrats increasingly sought more political 
surety through law so they turned to the state, which, at the time meant, 
the crown. Louis XI (1423–1483) of France, Henry VII (1457–1509) of 
England, and Ferdinand (1452–1516) and Isabella (1456–1504) of Spain 
laid the groundwork for centralized states at the expense of the feudal sys-
tem. But they were enabled by the desperate scramble of the aristocracy. 
They created standing armies and enlarged bureaucracies. As with Roman 
elites, medieval elites threw away the system that had elevated them in 
favor of immediate preservation of privilege.
Wallerstein (1974a:37) identified three explanations for the crisis of 
feudalism. First, a cyclical economic contraction beginning in the last half 
of the fourteenth century combined with a second that posits increased 
expenditure and demands on peasants by landowning aristocrats. Third, 
a shift in Europe’s climate lowered soil productivity. The elite—the land-
owning aristocracy—sought surcease by giving up direct management 
and, therefore, direct extraction of surplus by turning from serfdom or 
a similar feudal agricultural division of labor to tenancy. Some also sold 
their land to wealthier peasants. They turned to the crown and court to 
keep their privilege and advantage.
Review of the two crises in history, the fall of Rome and the demise of 
feudalism, shows a common reaction from the ruling class. They save their 
own skins. In the case of Rome, the main immediate threat came from 
external invasion. Medieval Western Europe successfully stopped external 
invasions from Asia—the Mongols in the thirteenth century and the 
Ottomans in the fifteenth. In medieval Europe, the crisis was economic. 
If the current crisis in the world capitalist system does indeed portend 
the system’s collapse, it is reasonable to expect similar responses by the 
haute bourgeoisie. They will scramble, often fighting each other, for every 
 possible advantage even while the system is collapsing. Their behavior 
will act as positive feedback to the crisis, exacerbating it even as they try 
to avoid its ill effects. They will seek new ways to extract surplus from 
the masses; at the same time, they will cut down the middle strata’s drain 
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on surplus while using the state to enforce both. These strategies entail 
a resurgence of imperialism, but of a new kind—something now called 
globalization. Although they will rely on state power, this does not imply 
any nationalistic fixation, as they are a global class—a fact of which they 
are individually and collectively well aware. Financial magnates from 
Wall Street hobnob with their counterparts from the cities of London 
and Tokyo. They do not consort with plumbers, computer programmers, 
or Indonesian sweatshop workers. In the centers of the world capitalist 
system, ruling classes use every method to keep their privileges. They 
employ and deploy their access to communication media and the culture 
industry to help keep control. When that fails or does not reach all of its 
intended audience, they will resort to force—police and military. Though, 
economic pressure and social control remain the tools of choice, they vary 
in technique and proportion by time and place. For instance, corporations 
employ paramilitary death squads in Latin America, states stage full-
scale military invasions in the Middle East, criminal justice apparatuses 
discipline in the United States, and so on. A consistent theme in all these 
strategies is the reliance on fear. To keep their privileged position, the rul-
ing classes secure fear.
The Current Crisis
The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon offered an 
opportunity similar to that of the Reichstag Fire of February 27, 1933. 
Another similarity between the two events lies in their murky causes. 
There remains no clear proof of or consensus on the perpetrators of 
either. Nonetheless, Nazi leaders had quickly claimed that Communists 
set the fire and U.S. officials identified Osama bin Laden within hours. By 
noon on 9/11, Senator Orin Hatch said intelligence personnel had briefed 
him to that effect (Tapper 2001). President George W. Bush along with 
Vice President Richard Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
followed the reasoning of a group of advisors grouped under the rubric 
of neoconservatives. It included people like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, 
and Douglas Feith. That reasoning led to military attacks on Afghanistan 
and Iraq as part of a Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT in military-
speak. The president couched GWOT in moralistic terms, identifying 
terrorists as evil and part of an axis of evil (Kirk 2003). Meeting with a 
central committee of the National Security Council at 9:30 p.m. the day 
of the attacks, Bush relayed the received wisdom of intelligence advi-
sors that al-Qaeda, allied with the Taliban, were behind the attacks. He 
assured those in attendance that they would have unlimited support in 
the  coming boundless war, and that the United States would employ the 
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use of  preventive attacks to stop future terrorism (Clarke 2004:23–24; 
Woodward 2002:31–33). Bush noted that the tragedy presented a great 
political opportunity (Sammon 2002:133).
Regardless of questions about the origins, causes, or perpetrators of the 
attacks, 9/11 marked a turning point in the history of the world, because the 
political and economic leadership took advantage of the opportunity Bush 
had identified. At this point, and maybe forever, their precise thoughts, 
plans, and strategies remain hidden. Nonetheless, analysts can draw reason-
able inferences from succeeding policies and actions. Moreover, the effects 
of those policies, coupled with secular political and economic trends, 
pushed the world capitalist system past its tipping point and into chaos.
In the last third of the twentieth century, the elite began a counterattack 
against erosion of their relative wealth, control, and privilege. A high point 
in wealth and income equality in the years 1968–1973 marked that erosion. 
Richard Nixon’s successful presidential campaign in 1968 (Perlstein 
2008) and the memorandum written by the soon-to-be Supreme Court 
Justice Lewis Powell (1971) reveal the basic strategies. The memoran-
dum advanced the interests of the ruling class on every influential front: 
political, economic, military, intellectual, and cultural. By the 1980s, 
it had turned the tide against equality, democratic control, and public 
welfare. That success became symbolized by the Reagan presidency, and 
the Thatcher premiership, and global and domestic neoliberal political-
economic policies. Neoliberalism had two measurable effects among 
the metropolitan ruling class. With an uptick in the rate of profit, they 
regained and expanded unequal distribution of income. Even so, there was 
a lag in a similar movement with respect to wealth mainly due to growing 
debt (Duménil and Lévy 2004). After the rise in rate of profit in the 1980s, 
it began to decline once more in the twenty-first century. 
An important part of the elites’ counteroffensive depended on the 
popular and political construction of crime and fear of crime. Barry 
Goldwater had first raised it as a national campaign issue in 1964, 
but Nixon capitalized on it. On the eve of 9/11, Americans believed 
interpersonal street crime presented a major threat (Altheide 2002), and 
they generally supported increasingly repressive and invasive policing 
with exceptionally harsh sentencing (Beckett 1997; Beckett and Sasson 
2004; Glassner 1999). By the new millennium, the United States had 
become the nation with most incarcerations in the world (Mauer 2006). 
Another part of the ruling class offensive rebuilt what David Altheide calls 
 “packaged patriotism” (2006:3). Signs of that outlook included a retrofitted 
and more capital-intensive military and the popularity of entertain-
ment, such as movies in the Rambo series. These revanchist campaigns 
 established a cultural landscape of fear of outsiders, who were identified 
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as criminals, and narcissistic identification with jingoistic militarism. The 
already-established cultural front became an essential ingredient for taking 
advantage of the opportunity offered by 9/11.
Important objectives for the neoconservative strategy had four intercon-
nected prongs: (1) aggressive military action to achieve a dominance of force in 
strategic regions; (2) mass support among metropolitan populations; (3) extr-
action of surplus wealth from metropolitan  populations; and (4) extraction 
of surplus wealth from the periphery and semiperiphery of the world. The 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were the most visible of these strategies. 
Coupled with those, the U.S. military extended its deployment of bases to 
new areas of the world, especially central Asia (Johnson 2006). Militarism 
secured fear internationally, while, domestically, continual terror alerts rein-
forced pervasive policing and surveillance to a degree far surpassing the capa-
bility of the Nazis (Gellately 1990; Jeffreys-Jones 2007; Johnson 1999).
Elite control in mass societies uses two interrelated strategies. The first 
identifies an enemy of the people (Ibsen 1882) and then uses the power 
of the state to neutralize the ostensible enemy. The second extends and 
expands the policing power of the state to defend against new or additional 
enemies of the people. Dario Melossi (1993, 2008) has argued that elites 
foster moral panics when their control appears to them in some way threat-
ened. In the past, the threats have taken the form of working-class gains in 
both the economic struggle and the political. Most recently, this occurred 
in the 1968–1973 period, and the elites did indeed generate a moral panic 
in the form of fears of rising crime and an imputed moral decline in gen-
eral. Examples include attributions of immorality among those receiving 
welfare, especially Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and 
people who consumed illicit drugs. Sometimes, the two combined as in 
the so-called crack baby scare of the 1980s (Reinarman and Levine 1997). 
Dario Melossi summed up the construction of crime fear.
It is conventionally agreed that this new era started in the year of the oil and 
energy crisis, 1973—the year when according to historian Eric Hobsbawm, 
the “crisis decades” began (Hobsbawm 1994). The tide of penalty (as well 
as many other social processes) turned also around this same year. Before 
1973, recorded “crime” had been on the increase especially in aspects—
so-called “street crime”—that were particularly worrisome for the middle 
class (before, because the US victimization survey, which started in 1973, 
has shown no definite trend toward an increase, contrary to common cre-
dence, as Katherine Beckett explains in her review of Garland’s The Culture 
of Control (Garland 2001a; Beckett 2001). Crime’s ascendance in the 1960s 
was taken to represent the general crisis in authority and conformist values 
and traditions. 
(Melossi 2008:199–200)
CAPITALISM’S COLLAPSE  37
Earlier in the same book, Melossi noted that “[i]t is the representation of 
crime, much more than the repression of crime—as we believed in the 
1960s—that plays a key role in social control” (155–156). Melossi con-
tinued by referring to totalitarian regimes’ use of the media, citing Walter 
Benjamin’s observations about the Nazis, where “the star and the dictator 
emerge victorious” (Benjamin 1936:247). The criminalized individuals 
become enemies of the people, those who threaten society’s very founda-
tion, the basis for the glue that keeps everything running smoothly, espe-
cially the cycle of capitalist production (Mead 1918). Typically, outsiders 
fall into the criminalized population. Melossi (2008:235) called them la 
canaille, those who have subminimum moral worth as humans, who pur-
sue their own ends, and do not fit into the prescribed class roles needed 
for the social machinery. Jews, Gypsies, and those who were deemed “work 
shy” exemplified the category in Nazi Germany (Burleigh and Wipperman 
1991). They wound up in the concentration camps. In the United States, 
and more recently in Western Europe, recent immigrants supplied the 
human universe for la canaille, with, of course, the usual stand-bys of 
African and Native Americans. Furthermore, restrictive immigration 
policies operate with double efficiency, as immigrants who do not pass 
through official channels automatically acquire an “illegal” status by virtue 
of their lack of documentation alone. 
Melossi’s diagnosis fails to emphasize two factors. First, the construction 
of a criminal class does not just intensify social cohesion by scapegoating in 
a quintessentially Durkheimian way (Durkheim 1893, 1895, 1896). The cul-
tural gesture is accompanied by material movement. Increased policing and 
surveillance control everyone, not just the designated enemies of the people. 
Consider the recurrent stories of prominent persons—media stars, national 
politicians, and even the occasional plutocrat—whom the Transportation 
Security Agency (TSA) stop from boarding flights because their names 
inadvertently (ostensibly, at least) show up on a suspect list, or worse yet, 
a “no fly” list. In addition, mass incarceration creates a system of camps or 
lagers to which populations are removed, segregated from society, and where 
they become mere or bare life, without full human status (Agamben 1995). 
Such camps have played an important, if not essential, role in imperialist 
enterprises—from the reservations for Native Americans established in the 
nineteenth century, camps in Cuba for those who opposed Spanish rule, and 
the interring of Boers in South Africa by Lord Kitchener in the early twentieth 
century, to today’s camps in the United States holding “illegal” immigrants. 
The latter are not charged with crimes, but are interred under civil law, and, 
therefore, cannot enjoy the benefits of the Bill of Rights. 
Melossi’s basic argument makes a cogent case for recurrent repres-
sions coinciding with threats to ruling-class control. While Melossi used 
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it to explain criminal justice policy, especially in the United States, a for-
tiori, it applies to the current situation of the collapsing world capitalist 
system. A telling part of the picture pertains to U.S. immigration policy. 
Immigration prosecutions account for 53 percent of all federal prosecu-
tions as of March 2009, and they have constituted a majority for several 
years. Almost all such cases come from the Department of Homeland 
Security—the domestic arm of the GWOT(TRAC 2009a, b, and c). On 
the surface, these data support one of Immanuel Wallerstein’s predictions 
about the consequences of a collapsing and bifurcating world capitalist 
system—namely, that core societies will exercise increasingly restrictive 
immigration policies. Moreover, the data support a generalization of 
Melossi’s argument regarding la canaille, as most prosecutions target the 
usual suspects—immigrant populations who enter the United States for 
a better life. They are neither terrorists nor criminal schemers. They do, 
nevertheless, serve to reinforce elite control. 
Chalmers Johnson has become a critic of the strategies of elites in the 
United States. He is a true conservative, similar to Gore Vidal and Lewis 
Lapham, the former, longtime editor of Harpers magazine. They all decry 
U.S. imperialism as a betrayal of American republican virtues. In Johnson’s 
most recent book of a trilogy (2000, 2004, 2006), he argued that militaris-
tic imperialism exhausts the public treasure so as to lead to the eventual 
collapse of empire. He compared the United States to Rome and Britain. 
In the case of Rome, he allied himself with Cicero to lament the pass-
ing of the republic—an inevitable result of imperialist policy. He com-
pared the twenty-first century United States with mid-twentieth-century 
Britain, saying that Britain saved its democracy by relinquishing its empire 
(2006:279). He laid the blame squarely on the George W. Bush regime. He 
compared him to other presidents who overstepped Constitutional limits: 
Lincoln in the Civil War, Wilson and his suppression of dissent during the 
First World War and the Red Scare after it, and Roosevelt’s interment of 
Americans of Japanese descent during the Second World War. He noted 
that wars have accreted executive power throughout U.S. history, but that 
the structural separation of powers in government checked presidential 
dominance. According to Johnson, the picture changed dramatically with 
Bush.
When it comes to the deliberate dismantling of the Constitution, however, 
the events that followed the Supreme Court’s intervention in the election 
of 2000 that named George W. Bush the forty-third president have proved 
unprecedented. Bush has since implemented what even right-wing com-
mentator George Will has termed a “monarchical Doctrine” (2006) and 
launched, as left-wing commentator James Ridgeway put it, “a consistent 
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and long range policy to wreck constitutional government” (2005). In 
doing so, Bush has unleashed a political crisis comparable to the one Julius 
Cesar posed for the Roman constitution. If the United States has neither 
the means nor the will to overcome this crisis, then we have entered the last 
days of the republic. 
(2006:244)
His argument has several flaws. First, it abstracts politics from the political 
economy and confuses the state with government. The United States has 
always followed imperialist policies. It conquered all its current territory 
through imperialist expansion. Since the end of the nineteenth century, it 
created an oceanic empire. After the Second World War, it took over the 
management of former imperial holdings of Japan, Britain, and France. 
The former Japanese territories, it held directly. Britain did not disen-
gage from its empire in the 1950s and 1960s to save its democracy, but to 
save the Exchequer and Bank of England, and, not incidentally, provide 
more effective ways for British investors to extract wealth from former 
colonies. The George W. Bush regime did not deviate far from the preced-
ing regimes of Clinton and George H. W. Bush. The later Bush’s regime just 
carried imperialist policies out less effectively. The main difference between 
George W. Bush and other presidents has been one of style and an inability 
to divert and distract critics. In sum, the anti-Republican trend discerned 
by Chalmers Johnson is neither sudden nor peculiar to one president. It 
just became more apparent as the crisis of world capitalism became more 
acute.
The creation, better termed culmination, of empire by the United States 
is not a cause, but a consequence of the collapse of world capitalism. To be 
sure, the behavior of the elites in the current crisis, as in previous crises, 
hastens the collapse. Nonetheless, empire represents an attempt by elites 
to keep and expand their privilege. They act like the officers of a sinking 
ship by grabbing all the life preservers for themselves. Not accidentally, 
Britain has been the closest ally in the U.S. military and imperial adven-
tures. Ties between capital holdings in the two countries have been inex-
tricably linked for many decades. Observing the recent imperialism, it is 
not far wrong to call it Anglophone imperialism. Australia, Britain, and, 
a somewhat less enthusiastic, Canada have joined the invasions and other 
projections of force. These same countries have assiduously curtailed civil 
liberties, expanded policing and surveillance. They have also increasingly 
restricted immigration. It is not a coincidence of language but of capital 
interests and ruling-class strategies. 
